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Does experimental philosophy have a role to play in Carnapian 
explication? 
Mark Pinder 
University of Birmingham 
 
This is the accepted version of the following article:  
 Pinder, M. 2017. Does experimental philosophy have a role to play in Carnapian explication? 
Ratio. Doi: 10.1111/rati.12164.  
which has been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12164. 
Abstract. Shepherd and Justus argue that experimental philosophy has an important role to play in the method of 
Carnapian explication, facilitating the preparatory stage during which the concept to be explicated is clarified. I 
raise concerns about their specific proposal, before sketching an alternative. In particular, I suggest that 
experimental philosophy can directly aid the construction of fruitful concepts. This provides a clear practical role 
for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical inquiry more generally. In this respect, 
experimental philosophy may rightly be construed as one aspect of applied philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
Joshua Shepherd and James Justus (2015) argue that experimental philosophy can be incorporated, 
perhaps surprisingly, into Carnap’s (1950) method of explication:1 they propose that experimental 
philosophy play a clarificatory role in the initial preparatory stage of explication. Shepherd and Justus 
take themselves to have highlighted “a compelling new positive program for [experimental 
philosophy]” (2015: 391).  
                                                     
1 Schupbach (2017) argues that experimental philosophy can be incorporated into ‘Oppenheimian explication’, a method for 
illuminating concepts; and I have argued (forthcoming) that Carnapian explication can be used to resist a certain kind of 
objection raised by experimental philosophers to so-called ‘arguments from reference’ (Mallon et al. 2009). Nothing herein 
bears upon these projects.  
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 I endorse the authors’ search for new, important, positive work for experimental philosophy. 
And I agree that such work might be found in connection with Carnap’s method of explication. But I 
am unconvinced by Shepherd and Justus’ specific proposal: as I argue in §3, there are reasons to doubt 
that the proposal brings any genuine benefits to the method of explication. I suggest that a more 
promising proposal would afford experimental philosophy a role in the construction of fruitful concepts. 
I sketch such a proposal in §4. If right, experimental philosophy can play an active role in the 
development of theoretical conceptual frameworks, directly affecting the shape of future scientific 
inquiry. 
The upshot is that experimental philosophy may count, in one good sense, as applied 
philosophy. It is a genuinely practical concern how theorists should engineer their concepts for the 
purposes of theorising, and the method of explication addresses that practical concern directly. In this 
sense, it is natural to think of the method of explication as one aspect of applied philosophy. And thus, 
insofar as experimental philosophy plays an important role within that method, it too can be construed 
as applied philosophy.  
2. Carnapian explication 
Explication, as introduced by Carnap, is a method for replacing terms and concepts with more precise 
counterparts, in order to facilitate theorising. The imprecise term or concept with which we start, called 
the explicandum, may “belong to everyday language or to a previous stage in the development of 
scientific language” (Carnap 1950: 3). The precise replacement is called the explicatum.2 
 The method begins with an informal clarification of the explicandum (Carnap 1950: 4–5; 1963: 
933). Anticipating Shepherd and Justus’ terminology, I call this stage explication preparation. Such 
clarification is a “means for reaching a relatively good mutual understanding as to [the explicandum’s] 
intended meaning” and “serves only to make clear what is meant as the explicandum” (1950:  4). The 
                                                     
2 I sometimes talk of concepts, sometimes of terms. In each case, I suppose that an explicandum qua term expresses the 
explicandum qua concept; and that the explicatum qua term expresses the explicatum qua concept. Throughout, I use small 
capitals to denote concepts. 
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clarification is achieved with informal examples that illustrate how the explicandum is, and is not, to be 
understood. For example, prior to an explication of SALT, Carnap suggests that one might say: “I mean 
by the explicandum ‘salt’, not its wide sense which it has in chemistry but its narrow sense in which it 
is used in the household language” (1950: 4–5). One might go on to provide the explicatum NACL. 
After explication preparation, the theorist should provide the explicatum itself. Carnap provides 
four requirements that the explicatum should satisfy “to a sufficient degree” (1950: 7). First, the 
explicatum should be similar in relevant respects to the explicandum: we should be able to deploy the 
explicatum in most situations in which we would previously have deployed the explicandum. Second, 
the explicatum should be precise: exact rules for its use should be given. Third, the explicatum should 
be fruitful: it should feature in relevant laws and generalisations. And, fourth, the explicatum should be 
simple. 
Carnap gives the following example (1950: 12–15). The explicandum is WARMER, understood 
to depend solely on our sensations, and the explicatum is TEMPERATURE, understood as a quantitative 
concept. The four requirements are satisfied as follows. First, similarity: in most cases in which x is 
(according to our sensations) warmer than y, the temperature of x is greater than the temperature of y. 
Second, precision: rules for the use of TEMPERATURE can be given with reference to thermometers. 
Third, fruitfulness: TEMPERATURE features in (for example) the ideal gas law. And, fourth, simplicity: 
both the rules for the use of TEMPERATURE, and the law in which it features, are simple. In light of such 
considerations, Carnap takes TEMPERATURE to be “the [explicatum of WARMER] important for science” 
(1950: 14).  
A few comments about the four requirements are in order. First, as noted above, they need only 
be satisfied to a sufficient degree. With respect to similarity, Carnap writes that “close similarity is not 
required, and considerable differences are permitted” (1950: 7). With respect to precision, it is sufficient 
that the explicatum be more precise than the explicandum. Thus, in Meaning and Necessity, Carnap 
describes the method of explication as “[the] task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact 
concept […], or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept” (1947: 7–8, my 
emphasis). Fruitfulness, of which I will say more presently, is likewise a matter of degree. And, with 
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regard to simplicity, Carnap explicitly subordinates the requirement to the others; the explicatum should 
be “as simple as the more important requirements permit” (1950: 7).  
Second, most commentators, including Shepherd and Justus, take fruitfulness to be the most 
important requirement. Thus, Shepherd and Justus write that “precision for precision’s sake is not the 
agenda”, rather “enhancing precision usually enhances fruitfulness, which is the agenda” (2015: 388). 
Similarly, Schupbach writes that “Carnap plays favorites with regards to his desiderata, prioritizing 
fruitfulness over similarity” (2017: 678) and Dutilh Novaes and Reck write that “fruitfulness is 
ultimately the most significant requirement for an explication overall” (2017: 202). The spirit of 
prioritising fruitfulness is captured in Kitcher’s discussion of explication, in which he writes that 
“[t]here’s no higher standard to which our concepts are to answer than the efficient satisfaction of the 
purposes of inquiry” (2008: 119). And, certainly, insofar as an explicator is principally motivated by 
theoretical inquiry, it is natural to suppose that the fruitfulness of the explicatum is her principal aim.  
Third, I follow commentators in taking fruitfulness to be broader than explicitly characterised 
by Carnap. The latter takes an explicatum to be fruitful to the extent that it features in relevant laws and 
generalisations. However, Dutilh Novaes and Reck write that 
there must be more to fruitfulness than the formulation or derivation of universal statements. 
[…] Carnap’s view seems to be that an explication is useful or fruitful when it delivers ‘results’ 
that could not be delivered otherwise (or with much more difficulty), i.e. with the explicandum 
alone. […] The goal is to produce new knowledge about the phenomena to which the 
explicandum pertains. (2017: 205–206). 
Both Kitcher and Shepherd and Justus develop more localised accounts of fruitfulness. Kitcher takes 
Carnap’s account to be “deeply problematic for the biological, earth and human sciences” (2008: 115). 
He suggests instead that  
we conceive of the aims of the sciences in terms of the provision of answers to significant 
questions, where the sources of significance are various, sometimes practical, sometimes in 
terms of the satisfaction of disinterested curiosity. (2008: 115) 
5 
 
And Shepherd and Justus claim that Carnap’s account of fruitfulness is not appropriate for epistemic 
concepts. They suggest that one way that an explicatum for an epistemic concept might be fruitful is by 
improving our ability to reason; perhaps, for example, “explications of epistemic concepts should 
consider how they might cohere with and ideally improve the statistical methods that deliver well-
supported beliefs in the sciences” (2015: 398).  
As these quotations indicate, what constitutes fruitfulness is to a certain extent up for grabs. I 
will make use of this flexibility in §4. For now, however, I simply note that there may be a variety of 
general and subject-specific ways in which a concept may be fruitful. Whatever the details, fruitfulness 
is likely to be broader than merely featuring in laws and generalisations.  
 Once explication preparation has been completed and a suitable explicatum highlighted, then 
the final stage of explication is to replace the explicandum with the explicatum. The idea is not to 
replace the explicandum in every possible context. For example, we need not replace explicanda with 
explicata in ordinary conversational contexts: we do not need to start asking for “NaCl” or “sodium 
chloride” across the dinner table. Rather, the idea is that, in the relevant theoretical contexts, the 
theorists in question are to use the explicatum in place of the explicandum: chemists (qua chemist) 
should use NACL when they might otherwise have used SALT; physicists (qua physicist) should use 
TEMPERATURE when they might otherwise have used WARMER; and so on. 
 Before proceeding, note that various philosophical objections have been raised against the 
method of explication; in particular, Strawson (1963) objected that explication involves a problematic 
‘change of subject’. As much has already been written in defence of the method I will not respond to 
such objections here.3 On the assumption that explication is defensible, I will consider whether 
experimental philosophy has an important role within that methodology.   
                                                     
3 See e.g.: Brun 2016; Carnap 1963; Carus 2007; Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017; Justus 2012; Kitcher 2008; Maher 2007; 
Schupbach 2017. 
6 
 
3. Experimental explication preparation 
Shepherd and Justus (2015) claim that experimental philosophy should be used to clarify explicanda 
during explication preparation, in a process they call experimental explication preparation. The idea is 
that experimental philosophy provides objective methods for clarifying concepts, and thus is well-suited 
to this preliminary stage of explication.  
By way of motivation, they highlight a particular challenge facing any Carnapian explicator: 
“pinpoint[ing] the content that merits attempted preservation [in the explicatum] and the content that 
should be abandoned” (p. 389). The challenge arises as follows. On the one hand, “being tethered to 
imprecise explicanda appears to hinder, not advance, the development of fruitful explicata.” (ibid). In 
part, this is because explicanda are “problematically vague […] amorphous and imprecise” (p. 388), 
and “many [candidate explicanda] possess content and encourage implications that would mislead 
rather than guide explication” (p. 389). Yet, on the other hand, “radical revisionism overlooks how folk 
concepts often describe features of the world and guide in theorizing about them, albeit rudimentarily” 
(ibid). So, for Shepherd and Justus, the challenge for the explicator is to preserve those aspects of the 
intuitive content of our concepts that will facilitate future theorising, while discarding the problematic, 
misleading aspects of those concepts. 
They introduce experimental explication preparation to help overcome the challenge. 
To pinpoint the content that merits attempted preservation and the content that should be 
abandoned […], a method for vetting explicanda is needed. […] With its insistence on using 
scientific methods to analyse empirical sources of information about concepts […], x-phi has 
an especially important role to play in explication preparation […]. Explicandum clarification, 
for example, is best achieved through empirically rigorous studies of the kind experimental 
philosophers conduct […]. (2015: 389–390) 
Experimental philosophy, then, can play a role in explication preparation. In particular, experimental 
studies can clarify the explicandum: they can “uncover regions of vagueness in extensions and 
intensions of concepts”, “reveal instances of conceptual pluralism”, “discover sources of bias”, 
“discover unpredictable (even if non-biasing) influences on conceptual judgments”, and “outline a 
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concept’s central features” (p. 390).4 Having explicitly mapped out such features of the relevant 
explicandum, the explicator will be better placed to perform “the explicative evaluation of [its] 
conceptual content” (p. 382)—and thus better placed to pinpoint the content that deserves preservation. 
Shepherd and Justus take themselves to have shown that experimental philosophy “has an 
important function within explication” (p. 400). However, pace Shepherd and Justus, it is far from clear 
that this is so. First, Shepherd and Justus have not provided us with a mechanism by which 
experimentation might have a genuine effect upon explications; and second, there are reasons to think 
that any such effect would be minimal anyhow. 
First, then: Shepherd and Justus have provided no mechanism by which experimentation can 
genuinely affect the explicative process. Their proposal is that the explicator should experimentally 
clarify the explicandum before embarking on the explicative process. But there is no obvious reason to 
think that such clarification will benefit the explicative procedure.  
Ultimately, it is up to Shepherd and Justus to provide the relevant details. But here are two 
possible mechanisms that they might have in mind. The first mechanism that Shepherd and Justus might 
have in mind is this: by giving the explicator a clear idea of the intuitive content associated with her 
explicandum, experimental explication preparation allows her to more readily evaluate that intuitive 
content with respect to the four requirements (similarity, precision, fruitfulness and simplicity), thus 
overcoming Shepherd and Justus’ challenge. However, such a suggestion, along with the challenge that 
motivates it, misconstrues the method of explication: explication does not involve the evaluation of the 
intuitive content of an explicandum to determine which aspects of that content should be kept and which 
aspects discarded. Rather, explication involves the construction of an explicatum designed to play a 
theoretical role, and an evaluation of the content of the explicatum. The explicator only ever considers 
                                                     
4 It is unclear whether Shepherd and Justus intend survey participants to be folk, theorists or a mixture thereof. Their challenge 
to the explicator is framed in terms of folk concepts (see e.g. their brief comment about ‘radical revisionism’, quoted above), 
suggesting that only folk need be participants. But Shepherd and Justus are also explicitly aware that explicanda can be drawn 
from an earlier stage of theorising (2015: 388), and folk intuitions would presumably be irrelevant in such cases. Regardless, 
nothing in what follows turns on how Shepherd and Justus spell the details out here. 
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the extent to which the explicatum satisfies the four requirements: at no stage does she evaluate the 
intuitive content of the explicandum. 
A second possible mechanism is this: by making the explicator aware of any vagueness, 
pluralism, bias, etc., associated with the explicandum, experimental explication preparation may 
highlight potential pitfalls facing her attempt to construct a precise explicatum. However, such a 
mechanism is of little value. For any serious explication, vagueness, pluralism, bias, etc., are not the 
relevant pitfalls: a serious explicator has prior knowledge of the field for which she is constructing the 
explicatum, and will be able to situate her intended understanding of the explicandum accordingly. The 
principal pitfalls facing the explication will typically be theoretical, and are most likely to come to light 
through a thorough understanding of the theoretical terrain.  
For example, consider Haslanger’s project to explicate GENDER (2000). (Haslanger does not 
explicitly use the term “explication”. But, if we allow fruitfulness to incorporate political and social 
ends, as do Carus (2007) and Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017), then Haslanger’s project is clearly an 
example of explication.) The explicandum is a good candidate for being vague (there are borderline 
cases of MAN and WOMAN), pluralistic (it is sometimes used to mean SEX), subject to bias, etc. But these 
issues appear not to be the serious pitfalls that Haslanger faces in constructing an appropriate 
explicatum. Rather, there are two serious theoretical problems, which Haslanger raises, that face any 
attempt to explicate the concept GENDER: “the commonality problem questions whether there is 
anything social that females have in common that could count as their ‘gender’ […]. The normativity 
problem raises the concern that any definition of ‘what woman is’ is value-laden, and will marginalize 
certain females […]” (2000: 37). The precise nature of these problems is not of concern here. The point 
is that those are the serious pitfalls that Haslanger faces; and it takes knowledge of the theoretical terrain, 
rather than experimental studies, to draw them out. I see little reason to doubt that a parallel point would 
apply in other cases of explication. 
 One way or another, Shepherd and Justus must provide a mechanism by which, on their 
proposal, experimentation genuinely affects explication—whether by defusing the above comments or 
proposing an alternative mechanism. Without a plausible mechanism, there is little reason to accept that 
experimental explication preparation can have an important role within explication. 
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Second: even if Shepherd and Justus can fill in the details, there is nonetheless reason to expect 
that, on their proposal, the effect of experimentation would be minimal. The heavy lifting within any 
explication is done by the construction of a fruitful explicatum. But, experimental explication 
preparation does not contribute to that construction. Experimental explication preparation serves to map 
out any vagueness, pluralism, bias, etc., in the explicandum—but such maps do not obviously indicate 
how to construct fruitful explicata. As noted above, the explicator does not begin with a full description 
of an explicandum in order to isolate the content that will prove theoretically useful; rather, she begins 
with a theoretical need and, to satisfy that need, she seeks to construct a theoretical concept that 
resembles the explicandum in certain respects.5  
Consider, for example, a recent example: the concept PLANET.6 Until recently, there was no 
agreed definition—merely nine canonical instances. However, in the late twentieth century, a number 
of objects orbiting the sun, comparable in size to Pluto, were discovered in the Kuiper belt. Following 
such discoveries, in 2006, the International Astronomical Union explicated PLANET in order to provide 
a more principled taxonomy of celestial objects. A planet was henceforth to be an object such that: (a) 
it orbited a star but did not orbit another planet; (b) it was large enough for gravity to have formed it 
into a sphere but not large enough for its gravity to trigger fusion; and (c) it had cleared its orbit of 
debris. Pluto, and the objects discovered in the Kuiper belt, were demoted to the status of dwarf-planet. 
What is important here is that the explication was driven by the theoretical need for a principled 
taxonomy of celestial objects. To find such a taxonomy, it was necessary to consider the properties of 
the celestial objects in question, rather than folk or scientists’ intuitions about what falls under their 
prior concept PLANET. As professor of astronomy Michael A’Hearn puts it: 
Why do we, as scientists, care how Pluto (or anything else) is classified? […] Scientists put 
things into groups, the members of which share common properties, in order to find patterns 
that will enable us to better understand how the bodies work or how they became what they are. 
                                                     
5 The situation here is complicated by the positive view I develop in §4. Nonetheless, the point will remain: experimental 
explication preparation per se will not lead to more fruitful explicata than Carnap’s non-experimental explication preparation.  
6 See e.g. Tyson 2009, Weintraub 2007. 
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[…] [I]t is clear that Pluto is not a planet like Jupiter but is rather a planet like the numerous 
Plutinos that live in the 3-2 libration with Neptune. Thus Pluto should be classified as the largest 
Plutino. (Quoted in Weintraub 2007: 229) 
From the explicator’s perspective, the important step in the explication of PLANET was to ascertain the 
common properties that would facilitate future theorising: once those properties were highlighted, the 
definition (a)–(c) could be constructed.7 This is the important work in explication and, on Shepherd and 
Justus’s proposal, experimentation appears to be irrelevant to it.  
  There are concerns, then, with Shepherd and Justus’ specific proposal. I do not take these 
comments to be decisive but, until Shepherd and Justus provide more details, I will remain sceptical 
about the import of experimental explication preparation. In the next section, I sketch an alternative 
proposal.  
4. Fruitfulness, uptake and experimentation 
Consider the following characterisation, due to Kitcher, of the attempt to explicate the concept FITNESS 
in philosophy of biology. 
Practicing evolutionary biologists know how to measure fitness. They do so by counting 
offspring. […] [V]irtually all philosophical concern with the notion of fitness starts from the 
idea that any identification of fitness with actual reproductive success must be resisted. The 
philosophical problem of fitness that has dominated discussions in recent decades has been to 
find some useful surrogate for the measure that field biologists seem to be using. One noted 
proposal has been the so-called propensity interpretation of fitness; a rival has been to suggest 
that ‘fitness’ ought to be treated as a theoretical term, whose meaning is partially specified by 
the correspondence rules of Darwinian evolutionary theory. […]. For the most part, biologists 
have ignored the arcana of philosophical accounts of fitness. (Kitcher 2008: 120–122) 
                                                     
7 On the view I develop in §4, the fruitfulness of the explicatum depends in part on uptake by relevant theorists: so, facilitating 
future cosmological theorising involved, in part, providing an explicatum that cosmologists would indeed use.   
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According to Kitcher, philosophers have been caught up with the idea that scientific theories and 
explanations are to be understood in terms of scientific laws. From such a perspective, the theory of 
evolution appears to be governed by a principle “to the effect that traits of relatively greater fitness will 
become more prevalent in a population” (2008: 120); but any such principle is trivialised if, following 
evolutionary biologists, fitness is defined in terms of actual reproductive success. Kitcher, however, 
suggests that the underlying view of scientific theories and explanations is inappropriate in this case: 
“[t]he practice of evolutionary biology […] couples detailed mathematical accounts with empirical data 
about the causes of some component of fitness […], and there is no need to invoke any grand principle 
of natural selection” (p. 121). The philosophers’ explication, then, is of little value to actual practice in 
evolutionary biology. 
 Accepting Kitcher’s characterisation of the situation for the sake of argument, it is tempting to 
conclude that, in at least one respect, the philosophers’ explicata for FITNESS have not been particularly 
fruitful. Regardless of whether the explicata could be used to formulate a ‘grand principle of natural 
selection’, or whether they could facilitate the generation of new knowledge or provide answers to 
significant questions, the philosophers’ explicata have not influenced scientific practice. This is 
suggestive of the following: uptake can be a contributing factor to the overall fruitfulness of an 
explicatum. That is, one way an explicatum might be more fruitful than another is if, all else being 
equal, the former but not the latter is adopted by the relevant theoretical community as a replacement 
for the explicandum in question. 
 For the remainder of this paper, I seek to pursue this line of thought. I sketch the conception of 
fruitfulness I have in mind, before explaining how it may afford experimental philosophy a genuine role 
in the method of explication. 
 First, fruitfulness. We saw in §2 that different theorists understand fruitfulness in different 
ways. For Carnap, a concept is fruitful insofar as it features in relevant laws and generalisations; for 
Dutilh Novaes and Reck, insofar as it produces new knowledge; for Kitcher, a concept of biological, 
earth and human sciences is fruitful insofar as it facilitates the provision of answers to significant 
questions; and for Shepherd and Justus, an epistemic concept may be fruitful by its improving our 
reasoning ability. Now, these different ways of understanding fruitfulness are not in conflict, and we 
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should not try to decide between them. Rather, I suggest, these theorists have highlighted a cluster of 
criteria, such that different concepts may be fruitful by satisfying different criteria in that cluster.  
 Three points are worth noting. Firstly, it is unlikely that each discipline will have its own, well-
defined cluster of criteria. Consider again Kitcher’s suggestion that fruitfulness for biological, earth and 
human scientific concepts be understood in terms of the provision of answers to significant questions. 
If Kitcher is right about this, then, nonetheless, his criterion might also be appropriate in other 
disciplines: perhaps, say, the concept of STRING in string theory is fruitful in part in virtue of its 
providing an answer to the question “What is the world made up of?”. And, conversely, other criteria 
might nonetheless sometimes be appropriate in the biological, earth and human sciences: perhaps, say, 
the evolutionary biological concept RELATIONSHIP CO-EFFICIENT is fruitful in virtue of its featuring in 
a law, namely Hamilton’s Rule. Of course, it may be true that some criterion is particularly well suited 
to some specific discipline(s)—indeed, I take that to be what Kitcher has in mind, and I have no 
objection to him so understood—but, regardless, we should not identify some given criteria of 
fruitfulness as being definitively for a specific discipline. 
 Secondly, the cluster of criteria might turn out to be open-ended. That is, we may be unable to 
give a list of criteria such that, for any given concept, it can only be fruitful by satisfying some of those 
criteria. (This is why I call it a ‘cluster’ rather than a ‘set’.) Criteria for fruitfulness are, at least to some 
extent, dependent on the specific aims that an explicator may have, and the specific context in which a 
concept is explicated may suggest its own criteria for fruitfulness. At the very least, it is a viable 
enterprise to suggest new criteria that hitherto have not been recognised as belonging to the cluster. 
 Thirdly, the thought is not that there is some algorithm for determining the overall fruitfulness 
of a concept by looking at the extent to which it satisfies the various criteria. Rather: a given criterion 
will only be relevant in some theoretical contexts (e.g. if Kitcher is right, then featuring-in-laws is 
largely irrelevant in the context of evolutionary biological explanations involving fitness); it may not 
be obvious in advance which criteria will be relevant (e.g. if Kitcher is right, then philosophers 
mistakenly thought that featuring-in-laws was typically relevant in the context of evolutionary 
biological explanations involving fitness); and there may not be any rationally preferred way to weight 
their relative importance (e.g. different theorists may come to different judgements about which of two 
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concepts is the more fruitful, without either being in error). This is not to say that ‘anything goes’. There 
may simply be context-sensitive and subjective elements to determining fruitfulness.   
I suggest we think of uptake as one criterion for fruitfulness: being adopted by the relevant 
theoretical community in place of the relevant explicandum may sometimes contribute to the overall 
fruitfulness of the explicatum. There are four points to make about this. 
Firstly, there are at least two possible understandings of the uptake criterion. On one 
understanding, an explicatum might satisfy the uptake criterion by its in fact being adopted by the 
relevant theoretical community. On the other understanding, an explicatum might satisfy the uptake 
criterion by its being likely to be adopted by the relevant theoretical community.8 It is unclear to me 
which option (if either) is to be preferred. The former is simpler; but, if we want the actual fruitfulness 
of candidate explicata to be a factor during the explicative process, then the latter criterion is perhaps 
preferable. Regardless, nothing herein turns on the choice, so I remain neutral in what follows. 
 Secondly, who the relevant theoretical community is will depend on the intended purpose of a 
given explication. Recall the philosophers’ explications of FITNESS. I suggested above that, accepting 
that evolutionary biologists have ignored those explications, it is natural to say that the explicata are not 
fruitful. However, this can only be fair if the philosophers in question intended their explications to be 
relevant to the biologists; if the intention had been, say, merely to provide a rational reconstruction of 
evolutionary biology, then the evolutionary biologists’ attitudes towards the explicata may have been 
irrelevant to the philosophers’ aims. In the former case, then, the relevant theoretical community is the 
community of evolutionary biologists; but in the latter case, it would perhaps rather be the community 
of philosophers of evolutionary biology. One must look to the intentions of the explicator to determine 
who the relevant theoretical community is. 
 Thirdly, I doubt that satisfaction of the uptake criterion is ever sufficient for an explicatum to 
count as fruitful. For any given explicatum to count as fruitful, we may also require it to feature in laws, 
produce new knowledge, provide answers to questions, or something else. Uptake might contribute to 
                                                     
8 Incidentally, the distinction here parallels that between understanding fitness in terms of actual number of offspring, and 
understanding it in terms of propensities. 
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the overall fruitfulness of an explicatum, even if uptake per se never guarantees fruitfulness. (By 
analogy: financial freedom might contribute to one’s overall happiness, even if financial freedom per 
se never guarantees happiness.) In contrast, I am open to the possibility that satisfaction of the uptake 
criterion may sometimes be necessary for an explicatum to count as fruitful. For example, recall the 
IAU’s explication of PLANET. The IAU’s aim was not merely to provide a principled explicatum, but 
also to thereby standardise the conceptual framework that cosmologists use. I take it to be at least prima 
facie plausible that, in this case, uptake (amongst cosmologists) was a necessary condition for 
fruitfulness. 
 Fourthly, let me say some brief words about why we might think of uptake as an appropriate 
criterion for fruitfulness. Abstractly, it is natural to think of the fruitfulness of an explicatum as being 
tied to the extent to which the introduction of that explicatum directly facilitates, or contributes to, the 
progression of the relevant theoretical inquiry. So: featuring in laws can be a criterion for fruitfulness 
as some theoretical inquiries can be progressed by the construction of laws that govern target 
phenomena; producing new knowledge can be a criterion for fruitfulness as some theoretical inquiries 
can be progressed by our gaining new knowledge about target phenomena; providing answers to 
questions can be a criterion for fruitfulness as some theoretical inquiries can be progressed by the 
provision of explanations of target phenomena; and so on. Similarly, being adopted by the relevant 
theoretical community can be a criterion for fruitfulness as some theoretical inquiries can be progressed 
by standardising the conceptual frameworks used for thinking about target phenomena. That is, in some 
theoretical inquiries, standardising how the phenomena are conceptualised within the relevant 
theoretical community constitutes a form of progress. If this is right, it is natural to think of uptake as a 
criterion for fruitfulness. 
 There are at least three reasons why we might think that standardising conceptual frameworks 
can constitute progress in theoretical inquiry. First, as plausibly illustrated by the IAU, theorists 
sometimes construct explicata specifically intending those explicata to be adopted by the relevant 
theoretical community: if we take explicators’ intentions seriously, we should allow uptake to 
sometimes be a criterion for fruitfulness. Second, as argued extensively by Kuhn (1962), one hallmark 
of (non-revolutionary) mature science is consensus on exemplars of good theoretical practice, a 
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consensus which builds on shared theories and metaphysical presuppositions. Such consensus plausibly 
requires there to be a standardised conceptual framework within the relevant theoretical community for 
thinking about target phenomena. If this is right, then standardising a conceptual framework is one 
aspect of the progression from immature to mature science. More generally, this supports the idea that 
standardising conceptual frameworks can constitute progress in theoretical inquiry, and thus that uptake 
is an appropriate criterion for fruitfulness.  
A third reason is that a standardised conceptual framework leads to social epistemic benefits. 
For example, when theorists grasp the same theoretical concepts, they are able to communicate 
successfully about their subject matter with greater reliability, facilitating the sharing of theoretical 
knowledge through testimony and collaborative inquiry. Moreover, a shared set of relevant concepts is 
likely to be a precondition of collective knowledge attributions to a theoretical community.9 For 
example, plausibly, it is currently appropriate to ascribe to cosmologists the collective knowledge that 
Pluto is not a planet. Yet, prior to the IAU’s explication, a parallel ascription making use of the 
explicandum would have been inappropriate: there was no sufficiently widely shared conception of 
planethood to ground an ascription of collective knowledge of Pluto’s planetary status.10 Adoption of 
an explicatum, it seems, can open up new possibilities for collective knowledge. That is, uptake can 
lead to social epistemic benefits. 
 Let me summarise. I have sketched an account of fruitfulness on which various different criteria 
can contribute to the overall fruitfulness of the explicatum, where the relevant criteria cannot be 
determined without reference to the specific theoretical context in which the explication is performed. 
I have suggested, offering brief words in defence, that we consider uptake to be one such criterion: 
adoption by the relevant theoretical community is one factor, amongst others, that can contribute to the 
overall fruitfulness of an explicatum.  
                                                     
9 This is so whether or not we accept that collective knowledge attribution is, strictly speaking, a species of knowledge 
attribution, and also whether such attributions are grounded in the sum or distribution of individuals’ mental states. 
10 See Tyson 2009. 
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 It should be immediately clear that, construing fruitfulness in this way, experimentation could 
play an important role in the construction of fruitful explicata. The reason is that determining the 
conditions under which various communities adopt a given explicatum is an empirical matter. To 
understand the social, political, psychological, theoretical and other factors that contribute to whether 
an explicatum is adopted, we will likely require a significant amount of data. In particular, in order to 
distinguish the factors in play, given the complexity of the issue, we will likely require the kind of data 
that can only be obtained by manipulating one factor at a time—which is just to say that we would need 
experimental data. With such data to hand, we could begin to understand how to construct explicata 
that are more likely to be adopted by the relevant theoretical communities; and this understanding could 
then be applied in practice to the construction of explicata. In cases where the uptake criterion applied, 
experimentation would thus aid the construction of fruitful explicata. 
Such experimental data, however, are not of the sort typically generated by contemporary 
experimental philosophy. Rather, they are of the sort generated by social and political science and 
experimental psychology. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy would likely have an important role 
in the present picture. The reason is this: one factor that is likely to be relevant to whether an explicatum 
is adopted by a community is how well the individuals in that community take the explicatum to capture 
the central features of the explicandum, and how well they take it to capture the explicandum’s key 
connections to other concepts. If most theorists within a given community think that the explicatum 
fails to capture the central features of the explicandum, and fails to preserve its key connections to other 
concepts, then the community will likely reject the explication—that is, the explicatum will likely not 
be adopted in place of the explicandum.  
(This explains, for example, why it is typically so difficult to explicate a concept uniformly 
across a variety of disciplines. Consider the concept SPECIES: evolutionary biologists may seek a 
taxonomy aligned with evolutionary history; veterinary scientists may seek a taxonomy aligned with 
physiology; bacteriologists may seek a taxonomy aligned with the interests of (human) medicine; and 
so on. In each case, at least one community of theorists is likely to reject any given explication of 
SPECIES because the explicatum fails to capture some feature of the explicandum that theorists in that 
community take to be central.) 
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If this is right, then experimental philosophy can have a role to play in the construction of 
fruitful explicata: in cases in which the uptake criterion applies, adoption by the relevant theoretical 
community is one factor that contributes to the overall fruitfulness of the explicatum; and the explicatum 
will more likely be adopted if the explicator pays close attention to what the theorists in that community 
take the central features and key conceptual connections of the explicandum to be; and one task to which 
experimental philosophy is suited is to uncovering what various groups of people take the central 
features and key conceptual connections of a concept to be. Indeed, on the latter point, Shepherd and 
Justus are in agreement, writing that the 
empirically rigorous studies of the kind experimental philosophers conduct [can] outline a 
concept’s features and its dependence relations with other concepts. Work on ‘innateness’ 
reveals its central features and indicates the problematic relationships between them (Griffiths 
et al. 2009). And work on ‘free will’ has uncovered connections between ‘consciousness’ and 
capacities for agential behaviour (Shepherd 2012). (Shepherd and Justus 2015: 390–391).   
To expand briefly on one example, Griffiths et al. provide evidence that there are three central features 
that are particularly associated with folk judgements of whether or not a particular trait is innate in a 
certain kind of organism: Fixity, the trait being generally hard to change once acquired by an organism 
of that kind; Typicality, the trait being common to organisms of that kind; and Teleology, the trait being 
something that organisms of that kind are supposed to develop or possess (2009: 609). The evidence 
was obtained by asking participants the strength of the agreement with statements such as “trait x is 
innate”, for the eight possible sets of features possessed by the trait (i.e. either Fixed or not, and either 
Typical or not, and either Teleological or not). The results suggested that Fixity and Typicality are 
closely associated with folk judgements of innateness, and Teleology less so.11  
Although such studies focus on folk, the general point carries across to theorists: experimental 
philosophy can play a role in determining the central features and key conceptual connections of 
                                                     
11 See Griffiths et al. 2009 for details. 
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concepts as understood by relevant theoretical communities. The upshot is that experimental 
philosophy has a potentially important role to play in Carnapian explication.  
The proposal, then, is this. Suppose that one seeks to explicate concept C and that one intends 
the explication to be adopted by theoretical community T. Then, to satisfy the fruitfulness requirement, 
one should seek to satisfy various criteria amongst which will be the uptake criterion. To satisfy the 
uptake criterion, one should seek to maximise the likelihood that T will adopt the explicatum in place 
of C. One partial strategy for achieving this likely involves ensuring that the explicatum captures what 
the members of T take the central features and key conceptual connections of C to be. But, to follow 
this strategy, one must know what the members of T take the central features and key conceptual 
connections of C to be. Such knowledge can be obtained via the kinds of experiments performed by 
experimental philosophers. Thus, one is best placed to construct a highly fruitful explicatum for C if 
one takes into account experimentally obtained data about what the members of T take the central 
features and key conceptual connections of C to be. 
It is worth noting briefly that this proposal avoids concerns parallel to those I raised in §3. First, 
I have provided a mechanism by which experimentation can have a genuine effect upon explications: 
explicators are to use experimental data to help guide the construction of explicata. In particular, the 
explicata are to capture what members of the theoretical community take the central features and 
conceptual connections of the explicandum to be. And, second, on this proposal, experimental 
philosophy contributes to the heavy-lifting within an explication: as a result of experimentation along 
the lines I have suggested, we would expect explicators to construct explicata that are more fruitful than 
would otherwise have been constructed. Insofar as fruitfulness is the principal requirement upon 
explicata, this is an important result. 
If this is on the right lines, then there is clear positive work for experimental philosophy to 
undertake in connection with Carnap’s method of explication. I have cast doubt on the specifics of 
Shepherd and Justus’ proposal to introduce an experimental element to explication preparation, 
suggesting instead that experimental philosophy can play a role in the construction of fruitful concepts. 
This provides a clear practical role for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical 
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inquiry more generally. In this respect, experimental philosophy may rightly be construed as applied 
philosophy. 
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